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1 Introduction 
 
The right of a creditor to foreclose a mortgage agreement, usually against the 
default of the debtor, and the subsequent sale in execution of the hypothecated 
immovable property is an important part of any modern credit-driven economy. A 
creditor, as mortgagee, may rely on the common law right to foreclose a mortgage 
agreement as a legally sanctioned means to ensure the enforcement of the 
mortgage debt. However, the foreclosure of a mortgage agreement will invariably 
implicate a number of constitutional rights and principles that are protected by the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the “Constitution”).1 
The Constitutional Court (the “CC”) in Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz 
and Others2 (“Jaftha”) held that a person’s right to have access to adequate housing 
in terms of section 26(1) of the Constitution may only be negatively affected if such a 
deprivation is in line with section 36 of the Constitution.3 The CC held that where a 
limitation of the right to have access to adequate housing comes about due to the 
enforcement of a debt it must be in accordance with section 36.  
Although the CC in Jaftha confirmed that the foreclosure of a mortgage is legally 
acceptable, section 36 will require a court to strike a proportional balance between 
the rights of the debtor against those of the creditor to enforce the mortgage debt.4  
In other words, a court is precluded from granting an execution order if it does not 
balance the rights of the debtor and those of the creditor where the debtor’s rights 
will be disproportionately affected by the sale in execution. Judicial oversight is 
therefore required to give effect to this balancing act. 
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The requirement of judicial oversight is an important development as many 
mortgagors in South Africa are indigent homeowners who often face the possibility of 
losing their home once an order for the sale in execution of the mortgaged property 
is granted.5 Apart from the proportionality test that has been developed against the 
backdrop of the Constitution, the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (the “NCA”), which 
came into effect in 2007, contains a number of provisions that are applicable in the 
context of residential mortgage foreclosures.  
One of the aims of the NCA is to ameliorate the problem of over-indebtedness by 
providing a debtor with a number of new debt-relief mechanisms. These remedies 
are important as they can, in some instances, prevent the mortgagee from 
foreclosing the mortgage agreement and enforcing the mortgage debt.6 The NCA 
therefore exerts a strong legislative influence over many aspects of the law regarding 
foreclosures and the enforcement of the mortgage debt.   
The paper investigates whether the NCA, if applied correctly and effectively, can 
provide the courts, in the context of mortgage foreclosures, with the necessary 
means to give effect to the proportionality test laid down in Jaftha. Section 2 briefly 
discusses the general principles of mortgage foreclosures in light of the Constitution. 
Section 3 deals with the NCA by looking at a few of the new debt relief remedies 
afforded to credit consumers and how these impact on foreclosures. Section 4 
discusses the English law in relation to mortgage foreclosures and compares it to 
South African mortgage law. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2    Principles of mortgage law and mortgage foreclosures 
 
Once an order for execution is granted by the court against the defaulting debtor, 
the sale of the mortgaged property may occur without the consent of the mortgagor.7 
In other words, a mortgagor agrees, contractually, that if he or she does not fulfil the 
obligation to repay the loan, the creditor may enforce the mortgage debt by 
foreclosing the mortgage agreement, approaching the court for a default judgment 
and an execution order, and then selling the mortgaged property.8 Furthermore, 
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upon the registration of the mortgage bond in the deeds office the mortgagee 
acquires a limited real right over the mortgaged property.9 
This is important as the holder of the limited real right may in appropriate 
circumstances enforce the mortgage debt. For this reason mortgage agreements are 
an important part of a modern credit-driven economy.10 The net result of the 
aforementioned is that large creditors, like banks, will more readily extend credit to 
debtors as they have a means to enforce the debt when the debtor is in default. 
According to Steyn, our courts recognise that mortgage bonds are an 
“indispensable” mechanism whereby homeownership is promoted and that the 
mortgagee’s right is “fused into the title of the mortgaged property”.11 
 
2 1 Mortgage foreclosures and the Constitution 
A mortgage agreement will often include a so-called acceleration clause which 
normally accompanies the foreclosure clause. An acceleration clause gives the 
mortgagor a contractual right to accelerate the outstanding mortgage debt once the 
mortgagor defaults on the obligation to repay the loan.12 In practice this would 
usually entail the failure of the debtor to pay the agreed periodic instalments in a 
timely manner. Once a mortgagee forecloses the mortgage, and accelerates the 
debt, “the balance on the loan becomes due and payable”.13 
Once the mortgage is foreclosed the mortgage agreement is cancelled. The 
mortgagee will then approach the court for an execution order against the mortgaged 
property. Although a mortgagee must act in accordance with the general rules of 
mortgage law and the procedural rules in relevant legislation, mortgage foreclosures, 
and the subsequent sale in execution of the property, can have an adverse impact 
on the constitutional rights of the debtor. This is illustrated by the facts in Jaftha 
where the sale in execution would have rendered the debtors without a home.14 
The CC held in Jaftha that the sale in execution would limit the debtors’ section 
26(1) right to have access to adequate housing and that such a limitation must be 
justifiable in light of section 36 of the Constitution. To ensure that the limitation is 
justifiable the CC held that an execution order must be subject to judicial oversight. 
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The aim of judicial oversight is to ensure that all the relevant circumstances are 
taken into account when the section 26(1) right to have access to adequate housing 
is limited by an order for execution. This is important as it ensures that any negative 
impact on the section 26(1) right of the mortgagor can only be justified if it accords 
with section 36, that is, the purpose of the limitation must be balanced “against the 
nature of the right and the nature and extent of the limitation”.15 Therefore, a court 
may not order the sale in execution of the mortgaged property without investigating 
all the relevant circumstances in order to maintain a constitutionally compliant 
proportional balance between the rights of the debtor and the rights of the creditor.  
 
2 1 1 Ntsane and Maleke: applying the proportionality test  
In ABSA Bank Ltd v Ntsane and Another16 (“Ntsane”) the creditor wanted to obtain 
an execution order against a debtor who was in arrears with R18,46.17 The creditor 
accelerated the mortgage debt and applied for a default judgment against the debtor 
for the principal sum of R62 042,043.18 The court confirmed that “there will be 
circumstances in which it will be unjustifiable to allow execution” despite the fact that 
the creditor could accelerate the mortgage debt and claim the outstanding balance.19 
The court in Ntsane confirmed that it would be unjustifiable to grant the execution 
of mortgaged property of debtors where it would deprive those debtors of their 
section 26(1) right to have access to adequate housing.20 Moreover, the court held 
that in light of Jaftha it was obliged to balance the rights of the debtors and the rights 
of the creditor by considering all the relevant interests of the parties involved.21 
Judicial oversight demanded as much. The court, however, warned that this 
balancing act should not as a rule prevent the creditor from enforcing the outstanding 
mortgaged debt lest it create “uncertainty and distrust in commercial activities”.22 
Based on this the court did not grant the default judgment as it would have deprived 
the debtors of their section 26(1) right. 
In Firstrand Bank Ltd v Maleke and Three Similar Cases23 (“Maleke”) the court 
touched on the fact that upon execution the creditor would be “afforded the benefit of 
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the capital growth in an immovable property” whilst the value of the homes were 
“substantially in excess of the outstanding balances owed”.24 The creditor would 
therefore, upon the execution of the property, gain a significant financial benefit at 
the expense of the debtors who would lose their homes and the growth in equity of 
the immovable property.  
The court confirmed that it was compelled to consider the impact of the execution 
order on the debtors’ section 26(1) right to have access to adequate housing, and as 
a result, had to consider relevant factors such as “how the debt was incurred”, the 
“financial situation of the debtors”, the size of the debt and the “attempts made by the 
debtor to pay off the debt”.25 Both the size of the debt and the financial situation of 
the debtors were relevant in Maleke. As stated above, the financial benefit the 
creditor stood to gain from the sale of the mortgaged property was in excess of the 
outstanding mortgage debt.  
The debtors had paid their monthly instalments for more than a decade and would 
not be afforded the benefit of the capital growth in the immovable property if the 
creditor sold the property in execution. Furthermore, the debtors were poor and 
would be adversely affected by the loss of their homes. As a result, the sale in 
execution of the property would have had a disproportionate impact on the debtors. 
The court therefore declined to grant an execution order as it would have been 
unjustifiable to do so in light of Jaftha and the proportionality test.  
Both Ntsane and Maleke illustrate the importance of judicial oversight in 
preventing the unjustifiable execution of mortgaged property by requiring the court to 
consider all the relevant information and balance the rights of all the parties involved. 
 
2 1 2   Creative alternatives and an abuse of process 
Two prominent factors that serve to indicate whether a sale in execution would be 
unjustifiable relates to the existence of alternatives and the presence of an abuse of 
process on the part of the creditor.26 It is beyond contention that a court should not 
allow the execution of mortgaged property where there is an abuse of process.27 
Where there are intimations of an abuse of process, or the execution order could 
have a disproportionate impact on the debtor, courts must consider “creative 
alternatives” to ensure that the enforcement of a mortgage debt is constitutionally 
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complaint.28 However, creditors under the common law are entitled to enforce their 
claims “directly against the hypothecated property”.29 Creditors are, by operation of 
law, therefore not obliged to execute the mortgage debt against other assets which 
would limit the adverse impact of debt enforcement on debtors. Thus, creditors are 
not compelled to use less disruptive or onerous means to satisfy the mortgage debt.  
The net result of the general principles of mortgage law is that the section 26(1) 
right of mortgagors could be limited despite the availability of other alternatives, like 
executing against other assets.30 This limitation, in the presence of other 
alternatives, could be construed as an unjustifiable limitation of the right to have 
access to adequate housing in light of Jaftha and the Constitution.  
 
2 1 3   Subsidiarity: the NCA and the common law 
As the common law cannot give proper effect to the right in section 26(1) of the 
Constitution, or the decision in Jaftha, the common law appears to require 
development to bring it in line with the Constitution. However, in light of the principles 
of subsidiarity the development of the common law will be unwarranted. The 
principles of subsidiary were developed to determine which source of law will be the 
most appropriate to apply where there is an infringement of a right in the Bill of 
Rights (the “BOR”).  
In an important article Du Plessis developed the principles of subsidiarity in light of 
a number of CC judgments.31 The principles of subsidiarity turn on whether 
Parliament has enacted legislation that gives effect to a particular right in the BOR. If 
there exists no such legislation, and the common law does not adequately give effect 
to the spirit, purport and objects of the Constitution,32 the common law must be 
developed. If legislation has been enacted to give effect to a right in the BOR, it will 
be inappropriate to develop the common law. 
Accordingly, Van der Walt states that an applicant, who avers that his or her 
constitutional right has been infringed, should not rely on the common law if 
legislation has been enacted to give effect to that particular right.33 Consequently, an 
applicant cannot rely directly on the BOR where legislation has been enacted to give 
                                                          
28
 Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz and Others 2005 2 SA 140 (CC) para 59. 
29
 Brits Mortgage Foreclosure under the Constitution 124.   
30
 121.  
31
 L du Plessis “’Subsidiarity’: What’s in the Name for Constitutional Interpretation and Adjudication?” 
(2006) 17 Stell LR 207 207-231. 
32
 S 39(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
33
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 3ed (2011) 66. 
104 
 
effect to the right in question. However, an applicant may rely directly on the 
Constitution if he or she attacks the constitutionality of the legislation.34  
The applicant should therefore rely on the relevant legislation and not on the 
common law or on the Constitution to address the infringement of the constitutional 
right. This principle is confirmed by section 8(3)(a) of the Constitution which states 
that the common law should be developed to give effect to the Bill of Rights to the 
“extent that legislation does not give effect to that right”.  
Moreover, the CC has held that there is only a single system of law that is subject 
to the Constitution.35 Importantly, the principles of subsidiarity support and 
strengthen the aforementioned principle by developing a single stream of law which 
must at all times give effect to the spirit, purport and objects of the Constitution. By 
developing the common law where it is not appropriate to do so courts will 
undermine the single-system-of-law principle.  
Although the NCA was not enacted to give express effect to section 26(1) of the 
Constitution, the NCA was enacted to regulate the consumer credit market in South 
Africa. Mortgage agreements are credit agreements and therefore fall within the 
ambit of the NCA. Therefore, courts should apply the NCA in the context of mortgage 
agreements instead of developing the common law in light of the principles of 
subsidiarity. This will ensure that a single system of law is developed that gives 
effect to the BOR and relevant constitutional principles. 
 
3 The National Credit Act 
 
The NCA aims to regulate the consumer credit market by creating a 
comprehensive legislative framework against which all credit agreements will be 
evaluated. The NCA, through several new remedies, impacts directly on mortgage 
agreements and mortgage foreclosures by providing a debtor with protection he or 
she did not enjoy under the common law. The NCA can be viewed as the legislative 
equivalent of the “creative alternatives” a court can use to balance the rights of the 
debtor against those of the creditor. 
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3 1   The NCA and new debt-relief remedies 
The NCA confirms the right of the mortgagee to enforce the mortgage debt by way 
of foreclosure.36 However, the right of the creditor to enforce the mortgage 
agreement is subject to section 129 and section 130 of the NCA which regulates the 
implementation of the debt enforcement agreement. 
 
3 1 1   Section 129(1)(a): the Notice of Default 
Section 129(1)(a) of the NCA sets out the required steps a litigant must take to 
enforce the credit agreement. It can be construed as a threshold requirement that 
must be satisfied before the machinery of debt enforcement may be set in motion. 
Section 129(1)(a) requires a creditor to send a written “notice of default” to the 
defaulting debtor. A creditor may not take any legal steps against the debtor before a 
notice of default is sent to the debtor. The purpose of the notice is to notify the debtor 
that he is in default as well as laying the groundwork upon which the parties can 
come to an agreement as to how the debtor will “bring the payments up to date”.37 
In the context of foreclosures the creditor will have to inform the debtor of the 
material consequences that flow from a foreclosure, like the acceleration of the 
repayment of the outstanding mortgage debt.38 The effect of section 129(1)(a) is that 
it gives the mortgagor a chance to bring the amount in arrears up to date whilst 
preventing the mortgagee from foreclosing the mortgage and invoking the 
acceleration clause to accelerate the repayment of the outstanding debt.  
Section 129(1)(a) is an important legislative development as it precludes the 
creditor from accelerating the repayment of the debt and applying for a default 
judgment if the debtor is not properly informed about the nature and the 
consequences of the debt enforcement proceedings. The Ntsane case is a clear 
example of a matter where section 129(1)(a) would have required the mortgagee to 
send a notice of default. The mortgagee would have been compelled to resolve the 
dispute, outside of court, by entering into talks with the mortgagor as to how he 
would bring the amount of R18, 46 in arrears up to date.  
In terms of section 130(1)(b) it will only be permissible for a creditor to enforce the 
debt if the debtor does not accept the creditor’s proposals in the notice of default or 
the debtor does not respond to the notice. A court may only make a determination 
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regarding the mortgage foreclosure once section 129(1)(a) has been complied with. 
Moreover, if the debtor and the creditor have come to an agreement about the way 
the credit dispute will be resolved, the creditor is precluded from enforcing the debt.39 
 Thus, section 129(1)(a) gives the debtor an opportunity to make the necessary 
debt repayments to bring the mortgage debt up to speed. This section also prevents 
the creditor from enforcing the debt without first attempting to resolve the dispute 
with the co-operation of the debtor. Legal action against the debtor should thus only 
follow if the mechanism in section 129(1)(a) has failed to resolve the credit dispute. 
 
3 1 2   Section 129(3)(a): the right of reinstatement 
Under the common law a creditor may enforce the mortgage debt even though the 
amount with which the debtor was in arrears was small. If the mortgagee foreclosed 
the mortgage the debtor could only reinstate the mortgage agreement by paying the 
outstanding balance.40 This is known as the debtor’s right of redemption.  
The facts in Ntsane can be used to illustrate the operation of the common law. If 
the mortgagor wanted to reinstate the mortgage agreement after the foreclosure by 
the bank, paying the R18,46 in arrears would not have sufficed. Only the repayment 
of the outstanding balance of R62 042,043 would have reinstated the mortgage 
agreement. In the case of most debtors the repayment of the outstanding mortgage 
debt is not a viable option. As a result many debtors will not be able to stop the sale 
in execution of their homes with their right of redemption.  
Section 129(3)(a) of the NCA gives a debtor a new right which did not exist under 
the common law. It states that a credit consumer may reinstate the credit agreement, 
“before the credit-provider has cancelled the agreement”, if he or she pays the 
“credit-provider all amounts that are overdue” along with other expenses like default 
charges.41 The mortgagor may reinstate the agreement unilaterally without notifying 
the mortgagee of his or her intention to do so.42 The right of reinstatement may not 
be waived by agreement or by a rule of the common law.43 Brits argues that in the 
context of mortgage agreements the cancellation of the credit agreement “refers to 
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that point in the proceedings after the property had been sold in execution and 
transferred to the auction purchaser”.44 
Therefore, a mortgagor will be able to reinstate the mortgage agreement by 
getting the amount in arrears up to date at any stage prior to the sale in execution of 
the mortgaged property. This new remedy is important as it does not require of the 
mortgagor that he or she repay the outstanding balance of the mortgage debt. As a 
result the mortgagor is afforded greater protection in keeping his or her home. 
However, the right of reinstatement does not prevent the creditor from enforcing the 
mortgage debt through a sale in execution. If the mortgagee complies with all the 
procedural requirements of section 129, and the mortgagor chooses not to use his or 
her right of reinstatement, the mortgagee may enforce the debt through execution.  
This is an example of a “creative alternative”, as referred to in Jaftha, that 
balances the rights of the creditor against those of the debtor in a proportional 
manner. The right of reinstatement was discussed by the court in Nedbank Ltd v 
Fraser and Another and Four Others Cases45 (“Fraser”) where it held that a debtor 
can prevent his home from being sold in execution by reinstating the agreement. 
Fraser confirmed that the amount that is “overdue” for the purposes of reinstatement 
in terms of section 129(3)(a) is not the accelerated debt, but the amount with which 
the mortgagor is in arrears.46 Thus, the right of reinstatement gives the mortgagor a 
financially viable mechanism whereby the sale in execution of the property, and the 
loss of his home, can be prevented by getting the amount in arrears up to date.  
 
3 1 3   Over indebtedness and debt review  
The concept of over-indebtedness is a novel one in the context of South African 
credit law. Section 79(1)(a) of the NCA states that a consumer is “over-indebted” if 
he or she “will be unable to satisfy in a timely manner all the obligations under all the 
credit agreements to which the consumer is a party”. As over indebtedness is one of 
the main causes of mortgage foreclosures, reducing the number of over-indebted 
homeowners can greatly stabilise the South African mortgage market.47 
In light of this the NCA has introduced alternative mechanisms whereby the debtor 
can reduce his or her over indebtedness and delay the enforcement of the debt. One 
of these mechanisms is debt review where a debtor is assisted by a debt counsellor. 
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Once under review a debt counsellor will guide the debtor as to how he can optimally 
employ his income to satisfy his debt in a timely manner. 
Debt counsellors will also attempt to rearrange the repayment of the credit 
consumer’s debt in a way that would be acceptable to his or her creditors.48 These 
mechanisms directly affect the operation of mortgage foreclosures. In terms of 
section 130(4)(c)(i) a court can adjourn the proceedings if the debtor is subject to a 
debt review. A court can also, in terms of section 130(4)(c)(ii), declare the particular 
debtor as over-indebted and make an order accordingly.  
The order may require of the debt counsellor to report directly to the court or may 
require the debt counsellor to discontinue the debt review.49 Moreover, section 
130(3)(c)(i) gives the court a discretion not to enforce the mortgage debt if the court 
is of the opinion that the creditor approached the court whilst the dispute was subject 
to debt review. According to Van Heerden, the aforementioned scenario will most 
probably arise if the debtor approaches a debt counsellor after receiving a section 
129(1)(a) notice of default from the creditor.50 
The effect of these provisions is to temporarily delay the enforcement of the 
mortgage debt by way of foreclosure where the debtor is over-indebted and has 
sought alternative mechanisms, such as debt review, to resolve the credit dispute. 
The NCA thus allows an over-indebted mortgagor to seek alternative means to repay 
the mortgage debt without the fear that the mortgagee will execute the property. 
Although the debt review process appears to be debtor orientated, a creditor may 
through section 86(10) end the debt review process by sending a notice of 
termination. A creditor may only send the notice after 60 business days have lapsed 
since the day the debtor applied for a debt review. After sending the notice the 
creditor may enforce the debt if the court is satisfied that the debt review should not 
continue.51 Thus, section 86(10) balances the right of the creditor, to enforce the 
debt, against the right of the debtor to apply for debt review as the creditor can force 
the debt-counsellor to approach the debt review process in an expeditious manner. 
Debt-review is therefore another way to balance the rights of the parties involved. 
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4    Mortgage foreclosures in English law  
 
The enforcement of a mortgage debt in the English law is generally viewed as 
being creditor orientated, that is, the creditor will come up trumps in the majority of 
mortgage debt disputes.52 Comparing South African mortgage law with English 
mortgage law can be fruitful for a number of reasons. The most prominent reason 
relates to the fact that English courts have grappled with the question of how best to 
balance the rights of the creditor against the rights of the debtor whilst being 
sensitive to the plight of debtors who could lose their homes upon execution. 
   Furthermore, a number of English scholars, most notably Fox, have argued for a 
broader conception of the rights that are potentially affected once the creditor 
enforces the mortgage debt against the mortgaged property.53 These rights include 
those of other occupiers, like children and the debtor’s spouse, who were not a party 
to the mortgage agreement but who are still affected by the loss of their home. The 
emphasis on the effect mortgage debt enforcement has on other, non-commercial 
interests is of great relevance in light of Jaftha and the requirement that the rights of 
the debtor must be balanced against those of the creditor.  
 
4 1 English Law: Enforcement Remedies 
For the mortgagee to enforce the mortgage debt, he must take possession of the 
immovable property.54 After taking possession he may sell the property to satisfy the 
mortgage debt. According to Brits, the right of the mortgagee to take possession of 
the property is equivalent to the “South African mortgagee’s right to have the 
property attached prior to the sale”.55 A court may stay the possession of the 
property in order to give the mortgagor an opportunity to repay the debt in full.56  
Courts have a statutory discretion in terms of section 36 of the Administration of 
Justice Act 1970 (“AJA”) to stay the possession of the property in order “to give a 
measure of relief to those people who find themselves in temporary financial 
difficulties, unable to meet their commitments under their mortgage and in danger of 
losing their homes”. Importantly, section 36 affords the debtor an opportunity to get 
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the amount in arrears up to date and thereby prevent the mortgagee from taking 
possession of the property.57 
The mortgagor, in terms of section 36, only has to pay the amount in arrears and 
not the balance of the outstanding debt. As Brits correctly points out, section 36 has 
a “similar effect as the ability of South African debtors to rectify default in terms of 
their right to reinstate the credit agreement” in terms of section 129 of the NCA.58 
However, the debtor must provide proof that he will be able to satisfy the debt in a 
reasonable time. In Cheltenham and Gloucester Building Society v Norgan,59 the 
court held that a reasonable time will be determined against the remainder of the 
mortgage term. Thus, debtors are given a more accommodating time frame to get 
the amount in arrears up to date thereby promoting a more equitable outcome. 
Fox argues that the abovementioned development protects the rights and 
interests of the debtor to some degree.60 They are protected as the court is given a 
discretion to stay the possession of the mortgaged property, provided the debtor will 
be able to satisfy the debt, thereby preventing other occupiers like the debtor’s 
children and spouse from losing their home.  
 However, the court’s primary focus is still on the ability of the debtor to get the 
amount in arrears up to date rather than protecting the interests of the debtor and 
other occupiers. This approach was confirmed in Bristol and West Building Society v 
Ellis,61 where the court held that it could stay the possession of the property subject 
to the debtor’s ability to repay the amount in arrears within a reasonable period. In 
other words, the court will only stay possession of the property if the debtor can pay 
the amount in arrears. If a debtor cannot do so, the court will not stay the possession 
of the property simply to protect the interests of the debtor and non-debtor occupiers. 
Thus, English courts generally follow a formalistic and statute-bound approach when 
exercising its discretion to stay the possession of the property.    
 
4 2 The mortgagee’s right to sell the property 
The mortgagee will sell the mortgaged property after he has taken possession of 
thereof in order to enforce the debt. The right to sell the property is usually acquired 
through a standard term in the mortgage agreement which is based on section 
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101(3) of the Law of Property Act 1925 (“LPA”).62 If the three requirements in the 
LPA are complied with, the mortgagee acquires a statutory right to sell the property 
without the interjection of a court. The three requirements are the following: the 
mortgage must have come into being through a mortgage deed, the debt must be 
due and the deed does not exclude the right of the mortgagee to sell the property.63 
This is in stark contrast to South African law where a mortgagee must obtain the 
leave of court to sell the mortgage property. The effect of the LPA can therefore be 
very harsh as the debtor, without the leave of court, will lose his or her home once 
the mortgagee sells the property. As a consequence an English court will only be 
able to determine whether the sale of the property should take place when the 
mortgagee applies to court to take possession of the property. This outcome appears 
to be iniquitous, if compared to South African law, as the mortgaged property in our 
law may only be sold subsequent to a court ordering the sale in execution thereof.  
 
4 3 The concept of “home” in English law 
According to Fox, the English courts routinely ignore the “home interests” of the 
mortgagor in favour of the commercial interests of the creditor in the context of 
mortgage debt enforcements.64 Fox argues that the right of the debtor and other 
occupiers to a home should play a material role when the court seeks to balance the 
rights of the debtor against the rights of the creditor.65  
The right of the occupier to a home, and all the non-financial interests that are 
related thereto, must form part of a court’s balancing act when considering the 
enforcement of the mortgage debt. These rights are broadly referred to as “home 
interests”. Home interests include the value attached by debtor-occupiers to their 
“home” in a wider social, cultural and financial sense.66 Although the right of a 
creditor to enforce the mortgage debt should not be compromised by the home 
interests of the debtor, such interests are relevant in the context of mortgage 
foreclosures. According to Fox these rights must form part of the balancing act a 
court should perform when it decides whether to stay the possession of the property.  
There are a number of reasons why a court must take cognisance of the debtor’s 
and non-debtor occupiers’ home interests. Firstly, the effect of losing a home on 
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other occupiers, like children, are significant and cannot simply as a matter of 
principle be trumped by the commercial interests of the creditor.67 The “home 
interests” of non-debtor occupiers are interests worthy of legal protection. The court 
must therefore at least investigate the potential impact of the sale of the home on 
non-debtor occupiers when considering the enforcement of a mortgage debt.  
Secondly, the argument that one should honour one’s contractual obligations is 
less persuasive in this context as non-debtor occupiers are not a party to the 
mortgage agreement.68 As a consequence the argument that a debtor is bound by 
the mortgage contract, one he or she voluntarily agreed to enter into, carries less, if 
any, weight in relation to non-debtor occupiers. In other words, a court should be 
more critical of arguments based on the principle of pacta sunt servanda when 
considering the negative effects of the mortgage debt enforcement on the home 
interests of the non-debtor occupiers.  
In light of the above Fox argues that courts should consider the effects of 
mortgaged debt enforcement on the home interests of the debtor and non-debtor 
occupiers. Courts should balance these interests against the commercial interests of 
the creditor to ensure that an equitable balance is maintained.69  
Despite these criticisms, English courts, much like South African ones, focus 
primarily on the enforcement of the mortgage agreement generally to the exclusion 
of other relevant considerations. One of the reasons advanced by Fox for this 
reluctance is the difficulty courts encounter in measuring the value of home 
interests.70 In contrast, the commercial interests of the creditor can be readily 
measured or quantified which tips the balance in the creditor’s favour.  
The creditor-orientated approach of English courts was evident in Barclay’s Bank 
plc v O’Brien71 and Barclay’s Bank plc v Hendricks72 where the court granted an 
order for the sale of the debtors’ family home even though their spouses were not a 
party to the agreement nor consented to the use of the home as security for the 
mortgage debt.73 The court was visibly reluctant to consider the impact of the sale of 
the mortgaged property on the home interests of the non-debtor occupiers. In fact, 
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the court in Barclay’s Bank plc v Hendricks74 expressly stated that the commercial 
interest of the creditor will only be trumped by the interests of the non-debtor 
occupiers in “exceptional circumstances”.75 
In light of the above it is clear that the English law does not differ markedly from 
South African law. English courts generally tend to attach greater weight to the 
interests of the creditor when balancing the rights of the debtor against those of the 
creditor. However, considering the home interests of non-debtor occupiers can assist 
a court when it balances the rights of all the parties involved. This is especially true 
in the South African context where our courts may not grant an execution order 
where it would be unjustifiable to do so. South African courts should be sensitive to 
the home interests of non-debtor occupiers in order to maintain a constitutionally 
compliant balance between the rights of the debtor and the rights of the creditor. 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
The right of the mortgagee to enforce the mortgage debt upon the default of the 
mortgagor ensures that large creditors are willing to extend credit more readily to 
prospective homeowners. Our courts have in numerous occasions recognised this 
right as being indispensable to the functioning of the residential credit market. 
However, in Jaftha the CC held that although the mortgagee enjoys a contractual 
right to foreclose the mortgage and enforce the debt, a court will not grant an 
execution order if it unjustifiably limits the debtor’s right to have access to adequate 
housing in terms of section 26(1) of the Constitution. A court must balance the right 
of the creditor against those of the debtor in a proportionate manner to prevent an 
unjustifiable infringement of the section 26(1) right of the debtor. The CC also 
emphasised that courts must find “creative alternatives” to do this balancing act.  
Under the common law our courts did not grant an execution order where there 
was an abuse of process or evidence of procedural irregularities. In the absence of 
proof of these two exceptions, our courts would order the execution of the property. 
Furthermore, after the creditor cancelled the mortgage agreement, a mortgagor 
could only reinstate the agreement by paying the balance on the outstanding debt 
even though the amount in arrears was relatively small. As a result the common law 
cannot give effect to the proportionate balancing act as required by the CC in Jaftha. 
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However, the NCA contains a number of provisions that represent the legislative 
equivalent of the “creative alternatives” mentioned by the CC. Section 129(1)(a) 
compels a creditor to send a notice of default to the debtor before he may enforce 
the mortgage debt. Section 129(3)(a) grants the debtor a right of reinstatement if the 
creditor cancels the mortgage agreement. In terms of this right, the debtor can 
reinstate the agreement by getting the amount in arrears up to speed. Finally, an 
over-indebted debtor may approach a debt-counsellor and initiate debt-review 
proceedings in terms of the NCA. Once the debtor is under debt-review the creditor 
may not enforce the mortgage debt. This allows the debtor to rearrange his debt 
making debt repayments more manageable. However, the creditor may terminate 
the debt-review in appropriate circumstances. The NCA therefore balances the rights 
of the creditor against those of the debtor in an effective and proportional manner. 
Furthermore, South African law compares favourably to English law. English 
courts tend to favour the commercial interests of the creditor over the interests of the 
debtor. English courts will only stay the possession of the property if they are 
convinced the debtor will be able to rectify the amount in arrears. In contrast, the 
NCA has given debtors and the courts a number of mechanisms whereby the rights 
of all the parties can be balance effectively and proportionally.  
In conclusion, the abovementioned provisions in the NCA represent, if applied 
correctly, the creative alternatives whereby the rights of the creditor can be balanced 
proportionally against those of the debtor. The NCA creates a stable credit market 
environment wherein both the mortgagee and the mortgagor are certain, ex ante, 
about their rights and duties in the context of mortgage foreclosure. 
 
